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The Boucher litigation' moved closer to its conclusion during
the 1958-1959 term. It may be recalled that during the previous
term Boucher and his colleagues were successful in obtaining
mandamus compelling the Division of Employment Security of
the Department of Labor to pay back wages for the period be-
tween a dismissal, unlawful because of lack of proper notice, and
a later dismissal based on a proper notification. The latter dis-
missal was upheld by the Civil Service Commission and Boucher
et al. appealed.2 The Commission filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the Commission decision had been allowed to
become final by failure to file timely application for appeal with
the Commission. The court held, however, that a person operat-
ing a mail delivery service at the capitol was, in effect, acting
for the Commission in receiving mail addressed to it. Conse-
quently, an application for appeal received by such person with-
in the constitutional period provided was timely filed even
though physically delivered to the Commission after such date.
To hold otherwise, the court said, would do violence to its policy
;of favoring appeals. The motion to dismiss the appeal being
denied, a disposition on the merits remains to be made by the
court.
The Dickson case3 also required further attention from the
court during the term. In Dickson there had been a dismissal,
lawful as to notice given, which had been sustained on the merits
by the Civil Service Commission. However, on appeal the Com-
mission was reversed on the sufficiency of cause alleged and
proved. The employee hence retained his civil service status,
but in the event of no voluntary payment of back wages by the
'department was required to bring mandamus proceedings; the
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See Adminigirative Law, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 79, 80 (1957) for
resume of events prior to the 1958-1959 term.
2. Boucher v. Division of. Employment Security, 235 La. 851, 106 So.2d 285
(1958).
3. Dickson v.'Richardson, 236 La. 668, 109 So.2d 51 (1959).
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Commission was said to be precluded from ordering such back
pay since it did not itself reinstate the employee.4 The employee
made demand and the department indicated a willingness to pay,
but insisted on offsetting wages earned elsewhere while the em-
ployee was illegally off the payroll. The department urged its
action as in accordance with the rule generally applicable in pub-
lic employment cases ;5 however, the court felt bound to follow its
own jurisprudence where the court rather than the Commission
had found the employee unlawfully off the payroll. In such pre-
vious jurisprudence the court had found no authority for offset-
ting wages earned and ordered full back pay ;6 the present case
was similarly disposed of. The question as to whether reinstate-
ment ordered by a civil service commission could be conditioned
on such an offset as a matter of commission discretion was left
open.
The Hermnn case,7 involving a dismissal after notification
of charges, presented the question in the last-mentioned context.
On appeal to the Civil Service Commission of the City of New
Orleans, the Commission found a charge stated by the police de-
partment not to be the true charge; the employee was therefore
ordered reinstated in his position with back pay from the time
of his dismissal, less any amounts earned in the interim. Back
pay for a period of suspension preceding dismissal was denied,
apparently on the ground that continuances in the hearings on
both the suspension and dismissal had been obtained by the em-
ployee for his convenience during the pendency of a federal in-
dictment for income tax evasion. The court initially considered
the dismissal to have been one made after written notice pur-
suant to the Constitution and hence a proper setting in which
the Commission could exercise its power to order reinstatement
"under such conditions as it deems proper."" Finding no errors
of law in the Commission's order, the court affirmed. The above
rationale was deemed to synchronize the holding with the Dick-
son9 opinion handed down the same day, ordering the Depart-
ment of Highways to pay back wages without deduction. Dick-
4. Dickson v. Department of Highways, 234 La. 1082, 102 So.2d 464 (1958).
See Administrative Law, 19 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 352 (1959).
5. 236 La. 668, 670, 109 So.2d 51, 52 (1959).
.6. State ex rel. Anderson v. Walker, Administrator of the Division of Employ-
ment Security, 233 La. 687, 98 So.2d 153 (1959). The court also cites Article
2749 as supplying an analogy from the area of private breach of contract.
7. Hermann v. New Orleans Police Department, 238 La. 81, 113 So.2d 612
(1.959).
8. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15(o) (3).
9. 236 La. 668, 109 So.2d 51 (1959),
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son was a case in which a Civil Service Commission had sus-
tained a dismissal by the employing agency, but had been re-
versed by the court and a judgment entered that the employee
retained his permanent civil service status. As noted, on later
mandamus proceedings no offset for wages earned was deemed
appropriate because Dickson was not reinstated by a Civil Serv-
ice Commission pursuant to conditions as authorized by the Con-
stitution, but had been found to retain his permanent civil serv-
ice status by the court.
On rehearing of the Herrmann10 case, after the Dickson de-
cision, the court amended its judgment to provide for deleting
from the Commission order the condition imposed as to offset-
ting wages earned during the illegal dismissal and the condition
disallowing wages from the time of suspension to the time of
dismissal. It was the court's judgment cn rehearing that Her-
mann had been illegally dismissed, since the notice did not con-
tain the true charge on which his dismissal was based. Hence,
the court stated, there was "no necessity, in law or in fact, for a
reinstatement." Presumably, in a case such as this, handing
down findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Commission
are to suffice as authority for restoration to a departmental pay-
roll, without the necessity of a reinstatment or back pay order.
The Hermann holding thus seems to narrow a bit more the area
in which a civil service commission may enter a reinstatement
order, accompanied by such conditions as it deems proper. Seem-
ingly it may now do so only if the dismissal was preceded by
written notice containing charges which are the true charges on
which the dismissal was based and which after hearing are found
by the Commission to be not proven it may, the court concedes,
also order a penalty against an employee reduced where deemed
to be excessive.1 The construction placed upon the Commission's
constitutional powers is justified on the ground that the Com-
mission has no status as a court and cannot enforce its orders. 12
Despite this frailty, from which all administrative agencies suf-
fer, the Constitution does clearly endow the agency with order-
making power'" and the constitutional objective of administra-
tive disposition seems throttled by the court's deeming it un-
necessary to remand reversed cases to a commission for appro-
10. 238 La. 81, 113 So.2d 612, 617 (1959).
11. 113 So.2d at 618.
12. Bennett v. Louisiana Wild Life and Fisheries Commission, 234 La. 678,
685, 101 So.2d 199, 202 (1958).
13. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15(o) (3).
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priate orders and conditions. It seems plausible that all rein-
statement orders and many pay orders of the Commission would
be followed by departments without the need of court enforce-
ment, particularly where a dismissal already has been found
illegal by the court. Even though the rule now seems fixed that
in mandamus proceedings the offsetting of wages earned else-
where during an illegal severance from a state payroll will not
be permitted under the general mandamus jurisprudence, the
savings incident to such offsets might still be realized through
conditions imposed in Commission orders.
The King case, 14 which was before the court a second time,
was originally remanded to the Civil Service Commission for the
purpose of taking evidence on the issue of political motivation
for the dismissal; this evidence was previously excluded by the
Commission on the ground that its only concern was whether
the employee was able to disprove the expressed charge to its
satisfaction. The court, however, ruled that such political evi-
dence must be permitted to come in because it is pertinent to the
truth or falsity of the formal charges made and hence to afford-
ing a fair and impartial trial.15 The Commission, on remand,
heard the excluded evidence, but found it without substance. The
basis of this second appeal is that this was error and further
that the evidence supporting the actual charge, namely, insub-
ordination, did not justify or support the penalty of dismissal
and that the Commission's order was hence arbitrary and capri-
cious. The court noted, citing Cottingham v. Department of
Revenue,16 that "where there is a real and substantial relation
between the assigned cause for dismissal and the qualification
for the position, the sufficiency of the cause assigned for dis-
missal is a question of fact which the Civil Service Commission
has the exclusive right to determine." Thus the court held that
the quality of "insubordination" was a valid criterion for de-
termining whether removal as an administrator would promote
the efficiency of the particular service and a clear question of law
for the court; however, since there was some evidence to support
the finding of insubordination, the sufficiency thereof was
deemed a question of fact solely for the Commission. 7
14. King v. Department of Public Safety, 236 La. 602, 108 So.2d 524 (1959).
15. King v. Department of Public Safety, 234 La. 409, 100 So.2d 217 (1958).
16. 232 La. 546, 94 So.2d 662 (1957). See Administrative Law, 18 LOUISIANA
L.w REVIEW 85 (1957).
17. 236 La. 602, 610, 108 So.2d 524, 527 (1959).
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In the Brickman case18 the court had further occasion to ex-
amine criteria for dismissal as formulated by the agency. The
employee was charged in the notice of dismissal with "lack of
adaptability" and "inability to work with others." In its initial
disposition of the case, the court did not quarrel with the mean-
ing ascribed to these terms by the New Orleans Aviation Board
and, finding some evidence of facts from which "lack of adapta-
bility" and "inability to work with others" as interpreted by the
Board could be inferred, the court affirmed the ruling of the
Civil Service Commission of the City of New Orleans. Rehear-
ing was granted, however, to give further consideration to con-
tentions that the notice inadequately apprised employee of any
legal cause for dismissal and in any event imposed a penalty,
namely dismissal, which was discriminatory, unjust, and im-
proper under the circumstances. After extended discussion of
the evidence, the court concluded that the Commission, despite
its affirmance of the dismissal, had actually held that the charge
of lack of adaptability had not been proven by the Aviation
Board and that as to the charge of "inability to work with
others," there was a failure on the part of the Board to make
a showing that such a criterion was properly related to the pri-
mary statutory requirement that removals be for reasons preju-
dical to the efficiency of the service. The court concluded: "The
mere fact that a civil servant has disagreements with her co-
employees or superiors or that ill feeling develops between her
and them or that she is unpleasant to work with or that she feels
her superiors are incompetent (so long as she is outwardly re-
spectful) does not subject her to disciplinary action, absent a
showing that such personality defects produce results found to
be prejudicial to the efficiency of the public service."' 9 This is
to say that "inability to work with others" is not a valid cause
for dismissal unless it is further explicitly expanded to mean
"inability to work with others in circumstances where such qual-
ity is prejudicial to the efficiency of the public service."
The court, having laid down the corrected criteria, then con-
cludes that "as a matter of law from the facts found by the Com-
mission . . . there was no legal cause for which appellant could
constitutionally be subjected to disciplinary action." Put another
way, the court seems to be saying that the Board, while it made
18 Brickman v. New Orleans Aviation Board, 236 La. 143, 107 So.2d 422
(1958).
19. Id. at 167, 107 So.2d at 431.
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findings that the employee was unable to work with others, did
not make findings that such inability was prejudicial to the effi-
ciency of the public service. Analyzed in this way, the court is
not going beyond its constitutionally limited role of, reviewing,
for errors of law; it did not weigh the sufficiency of the evidence
but rather found error in the failure of the Board to make any
findings under the corrected criteria. Of course, the court might
have concluded that the findings that the employee was unable
to work with others were impliedly also findings that such in-1
ability adversely affected the efficiency of the public service.20.
A dissenting Justice would have refrained from exploring'
the issue of whether the cause or criteria established as a basis
for disciplinary action does or does not impair the efficiency of
the service on the ground that such issue is "fundamentally,
within the orbit of the Commission's duties" and should not be
disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness and
capriciousness. 21 This is substantially the view sometimes en-
countered in review of federal agency action and is sometimes.
referred to as the "rational basis" scope of review; in effect, the
judiciary contents itself with a determination that there canbe
a rational basis between the criteria used by the agency and the
statutory standard and refuses to substitute judgment even
though matter of law is involved.2 2 The dissenting Justice would,
nonetheless, remand this case to the Commission for what would
seem a serious error in the procedure of the Commission, namely,
in effect limiting itself to a review of departmental action for
arbitrariness and capriciousness when the Constitution imposes
upon it the duty "to hear and decide all appeals and the legality
of all removal and disciplinary cases,"23 including the issue of
whether the dereliction of duty is such as to justify the punish-
ment imposed. He finds the latter issue to be necessarily in-
cluded in the issue of whether the disciplinary action was found-
ed on cause.
A second Justice joined in chastising the Commission for fail-
ure to make affirmative findings of its own on these issues. He
strongly expressed himself against the view, however, that in
circumstances such as these there should be a remand of the mat
20. Cf. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 16.07 (1959).
21. 236 La. 143, 169, 107 So.2d 422, 433 (1958).
22. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941) ; cases collected in DAVIS, ADwMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW § 30.08 (1959).
23. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15(o)(1).
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terto the Commission. Recognizing that the Constitution limits
the court to questions of law alone, he restated the view, "adapt-
ed from a principle of law obtaining in criminal cases and im-
plicit in several of our recent civil service opinions - that where
there is claimed to be a complete lack of evidence to support
proof of a 'cause' assigned for the disciplinary action taken in a
case, there arises a question of law which this Court may decide
after examination of the record. '24 (Emphasis added.) Certain-
ly, if findings are made without evidence to support them, it is
the court's duty to quash an agency order purporting to rest on
such findings. Here, however, there is more involved; the ma-
jority on rehearing said there must be a showing not only of
"inability to work with others" but a showing that such inability
"produce [s] results found to be prejudicial to the efficiency of
the public service." It would seem that in these circumstances
greater decisional responsibility in the Commission would be en-
couraged by remanding the matter to it for the purpose of mak-
ing the missing findings or not as the evidence dictates. If the
Commission has not discharged its constitutional role as "trier
of fact" it would seem salutary that it be ordered to do so rather
than impose on the court the necessity of making determinations
of fact from a "cold" record.
The Munson case25 illustrates that there may be ways to
"spread the work" among the politically faithful even though all
positions involved are covered by civil service. In this instance,
the Civil Service Commission found that two relatively high-
ranking positions, a landscape architect position and an engineer
position, were abolished by the State Parks and Recreation Com-
mission and the occupants of the positions laid off after appro-
priate advance notice. Thereafter, no attempt was made to fill
the positions but subsequent to the lay-off new employees were
hired, principally laborers. There was no evidence that the em-
ploying Commission was activated by the political or religious
views or activities of the occupants of the positions and the Civil
Service Commission abstained from reviewing the propriety of
the action of the employing commission in abolishing positions,
since it was acting within its authority and without personal
political animosity. Opportunity, in accordance with the King
24. 236 La. 143, 181, 107 So.2d 422, 436 (1959).
25. Munson and Carpenter v. State Parks and Recreation Commission, 235 La.
652, 105 So.2d 254 (1958).
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case, 26 was found to have been afforded employees to prove im-
proper political motivation, subject only to some curtailment of
the witnesses sought to be subpoenaed under the Commission
rules27 for preventing unnecessary disturbance and disruption of
the work of the state. Finding no error in the proceedings, the
order of the Commission dismissing the appeal was affirmed by
the court.
SCHOOL BOARDS
In Lewing v. DeSoto Parish School Board,28 the court had in
issue before it the meaning of the provision in the Teachers'
Tenure Act that a permanent teacher may petition a court of
competent jurisdiction for a full hearing to review action of a
school board in dismissing her on charges of wilful neglect of
duty. The school board sought to adduce additional evidence to
sustain its order of dismissal on the appeal of such order to a
district court. The district court ruled that the case be submitted
on the record as made before the school board and on the basis
of such record quashed the dismissal. The school board appealed
to the Supreme Court, alleging error in the failure of the dis-
trict court to admit such additional evidence and error in its de-
cision that the record as submitted contained substantial evi-
dence to sustain the charges. On the first mentioned allegation
of error, the court not only sustained the trial court but added
that "full hearing at the district court level was provided for the
protection of permanent school teachers and that such provision
confined the school board to the record on which it had acted
unless the discharged teacher chose to introduce additional evi-
dence in her behalf; only in such an event would the school board
have an opportunity to adduce additional cvidence. '29 A limiting
analogy might have been drawn from the statutory provisions
governing appeal from an order of the Public Service Commis-
sion where additional evidence may be adduced at the trial court
level, but such evidence must be referred to the Commission for
consideration and possible amending action before action by the
court.8 0
The court, noting that it was mindful of its own rule of re-
26. 234 La. 409, 100 So.2d 217 (1958).
27. 235 La. 652, 664, 105 So.2d 254, 259 (1959).
28. 238 La. 43, 113 So.2d 462 (1959).
29. 113 So.2d at 465.
30. LA. R.S. 45:1103, 1194 (1950).
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view' that it would not substitute judgment where substantial
evidence supported the agency order, but mindful also that it
was not limited to questions of law as in review of Civil Service
Commission appeals,8 ' reviewed the record before the school
board and concluded, as had the district court, that the board
acted arbitrarily and without substantial evidence.
In the Sepulvado case 2 a school teacher leveled a charge,
among others, that school board action amending maternity leave
regulations was retroactive and therefore illegal as to her, since
wshe was at the time eight months pregnant. The teacher in ques-
tion reluctantly complied with school board rules (when her
pregnancy could no longer be concealed) and went on mandatory
maternity leave for a period of fifteen months. The next devel-
opment, however, was not specifically provided for; a second
pregnancy was some seven or eight months advanced when the
fifteen-month leave expired. The child was born on August 17;
a week later she informed the school board she would be ready
'for the fall term opening September 3, attaching an appropriate
doctor's certificate. Cannily foreseeing this development, the
Board had, on August 7, adopted an amendment to its rules re-
quiring a teacher in such circumstances to take additional ma-
ternity leave for six months after the birth of the second child
and refused to return her to duty. Her petition in the district
court having been dismissed, the teacher appealed, attacking the
rule on the ground, among others, that it was retroactive and
therefore illegal as to her. While the court might have ruled that
'the amendment contained only such retroactivity as necessary in
the public interest to the orderly operation of the school system,'3
it chose rather to leave this question unanswered and to uphold
the amendment on the ground that it was merely interpretive of
the earlier general regulation and actually unnecessary since
there was an obligation under such general regulation to ask for
additional leave of absence in the event of a second pregnancy
even though the teacher was not then on active duty.
31. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
32. State ex rel. Sepulvado v. Rapides Parish School Board, 236 La. 482, 108
So.2d 96 (1959).
.33. LA. R.S. 17:1211 (1950) directs school boards to grant leaves of absence
to regularly employed women teachers for a "reasonable time before and after
childbirth." Some degree of retroactivity will inevitably be involved whenever a
school board implements the statute by appropriate rules unless it exempts there-
from all existing pregnancies; however substantive due process would hardly seem
to preclude such retroactivity since it seems reasonable and necessary to the order-
ly operation of the schools. See DAvIs, ADmiNISTRATivE LAW § 5.08 (1959) for
collected cases.
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